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Waldschmidtstraße 4b, D–83727 Schliersee-Neuhaus, Germany
Abstract
An assessment of the present status of the theory, some immediate tasks
which are suggested thereby and some questions whose answers may require
a longer breath since they relate to significant changes in the conceptual and
mathematical structure of the theory.
1 Introduction
Personal views are shaped by past experiences and so it may be worth while pondering
a little about accidental circumstances which channelled the course of one’s own
thinking. Meeting the right person at the right time, stumbling across a book or
article which suddenly opens a new window.
Fifty years ago, as eager students at Munich University just entering the phase
of our own scientific research, we were studying the enormous papers by Julian
Schwinger on Quantum Electrodynamics, following the arguments line by line but
not really grasping the message. I remember the feelings of frustration, realizing
that we were far away from the centers of action. But, mixed with this, also some
dismay which did not only refer to the enormous arsenal of formalism in the new
developments of QED but began with the standard presentation of the interpretation
of Quantum Theory. I remember long discussions with my thesis advisor Fritz Bopp,
often while circling some blocks of streets ten times late in the evening, where we
looked in vain for some reality behind the enigma of wave-particle dualism. Why
should physical quantities correspond to operators in Hilbert space? Why should
probabilities be described as absolute squares of amplitudes?, etc., etc. Since we did
not seem to make much headway by such efforts I decided to postpone philosophy
and concentrate on learning what was really done, which aspects were used in an
essential way and were responsible for the miraculous success of Quantum Theory.
Leave aside for a while questions of interpretation discussed by Bohr and Heisenberg,
extrapolations like Dirac’s transformation theory or von Neumann’s theory of mea-
surement and return to the more pragmatic attitude pervading for instance the book
by Leonard Schiff on Quantum Mechanics. For this purpose WaIter Heitler’s book
‘Quantum Theory of Radiation’ (second part of the first edition) proved immensely
helpful. Here I saw what the typical problems were which Quantum Field Theory
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tried to address and I also learned to appreciate the progress made meanwhile by
covariant perturbation theory and Feynman diagrams.
The next great piece of luck for me was (indirectly) caused by Niels Bohr. In
the course of the planning of a great joint European laboratory for high energy
physics (now CERN) he saw the need to introduce a young generation of theoretical
physicists in Europe to this area and offered the hospitality of his Institute. He
called an international conference in 1952 which I could attend and a year later I got
a fellowship for spending a year in Copenhagen. This clearly ended the frustration of
being isolated from the great world. The first fringe benefit of the 1952 conference was
a garden party at the residence of Niels Bohr where I met Arthur Wightman who gave
me the invaluable advice to read the 1939 paper by Wigner on the representations
of the inhomogeneous Lorentz group. Returning to Munich I followed the advice
and it was a revelation. Not only by putting an end to our concern about wave
equations for particles with higher spin but because here I recognized a most natural
starting point. The group, nowadays called the Poincare´ group, is the symmetry
group of the geometry of space-time according to the theory of special relativity.
What would be more natural than to ask for the irreducible representations of this
group? Equally remarkable was the result that these representations (more precisely
those of positive energy) correspond to the quantum theory of the simplest physical
system, a single particle. It has just two attributes: a mass and a spin. Everything
that can be observed for such a system, including, as far as possible, a position at
given time, could be expressed within the group algebra. No reference to canonical
commutation relations, guessed from classical mechanics, nor to the wave picture.
The wave equation arises from the irreducibility requirement. I could not understand
why this paper had remained almost unnoticed by the physics community for such a
long time. In fact, even in 1955 I was introduced at some conference in Paris as: ‘He
is one who has read the 1939 paper of Wigner’. This was indeed my major claim to
fame.
Probably all the young theorists who had the privilege of spending a year as
members of the CERN theoretical study group in Copenhagen will remember this
as a wonderful time. The atmosphere at the Institute with the spiritus loci, ema-
nating from the personality of Niels Bohr, and upheld by Aage Bohr and Christian
Møller who was the official director of the study group, combined in a rare way scien-
tific aspirations on the highest level with a friendliness discouraging any competitive
struggles and allowing everyone to proceed at his own pace. Though there was some
joint topic suggested, at my time it was the Tamm-Dancoff method and alternatives
to perturbation theory, with some emphasis on nuclear physics, everyone was allowed
to work on the subject of his own choice. So, after a short excursion into nuclear
physics I returned to my pet subjects. Prominent among them was collision theory in
quantum mechanics and field theory. The widely used recipe of ‘adiabatic switching
off of the interaction’ appeared to me not only as ugly but also as highly suspect
because the notion of ‘interaction’ was not clear a priori and if one switched off
the wrong thing one would decompose a nucleus into its fragments. This led me to
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appreciate the physical significance of various topologies for vectors and operators
in Hilbert space. Since in high energy physics the experiments were not concerned
with fields but with particles there was the idea that the role of a field was just to
interpolate between incoming and outgoing free fields which were associated to some
specific type of particle. Trying to implement this I unfortunately used the wrong
topology. But just at the end of my stay in Copenhagen we received a preprint of
the paper by Lehmann, Symanzik and Zimmermann who did things correctly and
thereby provided an elegant algorithm relating ‘Green’s functions’ in quantum field
theory to scattering amplitudes for particles.
Speaking of Copenhagen and quantum theory the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’
immediately comes to mind. I prefer to call it the ‘Copenhagen spirit’ or, more
specifically, the natural philosophy of Niels Bohr. I did have some opportunities to
talk to the great master but, in spite of my great admiration and some efforts, this was
not fruitful. It was only in later years that I understood the depth of various parts
of his philosophy. But there always remained one disagreement which came from
the question: what are we trying to do and what is guiding us? Physics began by
the recognition that there are relations between phenomena which are reproducible.
These could be studied systematically, isolating simple processes, controlling and re-
fining the conditions under which they occur. The formulation of the regularities
found and the unification of the results of many different experiments by one coher-
ent picture was achieved by a mapping into abstract worlds: a world of appropriate
concepts and a world of mathematical structures dealing with relations within and
between various sets of mental constructs, one of them being the set of complex num-
bers. This endeavor manifestly led to some level of understanding of ‘the laws of na-
ture’ as evidenced by the development of a technology which provided mankind with
enormous powers to serve their conveniences and vices. But what was understood
and what was the relative role in this process played by observations, by creation of
concepts and by mathematics? When Dirac wrote on the first pages of the 1930 edi-
tion of his famous book: ‘The only object of theoretical physics is to calculate results
that can be compared with experiment ’, this can hardly be taken at face value. As
he often testified later, he was searching for beauty and he found it in mathematical
structures. So much so that he preferred to look for beautiful mathematics first and
consider their possible physical relevance later. Indeed, the road from phenomena to
concepts and mathematics is not a one-way street. As the studies shifted from coarser
to finer features the theory could not be derived directly from experiments but, as
Einstein put it, it had to be freely invented and tested subsequently by suggesting
experiments. In this passage back and forth between phenomena and mental struc-
tures many aspects entered which cannot be rationalized. The belief in harmony,
simplicity, beauty are driving forces and they relate more to musicality than to logic
or observations.
There was one further highly significant and somewhat accidental occurrence in
shaping my subsequent work and this may also illustrate the above remarks. Pro-
fessors F. Bopp and W. Maak in Munich decided in 1955 that it was important to
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exchange experience between theoretical physicists arid mathematicians. This ini-
tiative was not rewarded by visible success. The number of participants dwindled
quickly and the enterprise ended after a few months. But for me it was of paramount
importance. I was introduced there to rather recent work of the Russian mathe-
maticians Gelfand and Naimark on involutive, normed algebras and to the work of
von Neumann on operator algebras and reduction theory. I saw that Hilbert space
resides in some wider setting which, at least from the mathematical point of view,
constitutes a rather canonical structure resulting from a few natural structural rela-
tions. Besides the standard algebraic operations it needed a *-operation (involution)
and one is led to a natural topology induced by a unique ‘minimal regular norm’. It
appeared highly likely that this structure was behind the scenes in the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory. The prototype of such an algebra is furnished by group
theory. There a most important tool is the consideration of functions of the group
with values in the complex numbers. They form obviously a linear space because we
can multiply them by complex numbers and add them. If there is a distinguished
measure on the group (which is the case for compact groups and, up to a normal-
ization factor, for locally compact ones) the group multiplication defines a product
in the space of these functions, the convolution product. The inverse in the group
defines a *-operation in this algebra of functions by f ∗(g) = f¯(g−1). The resulting
algebra yields the representation theory of the group. An irreducible representation
corresponds to a minimal (left) ideal in the algebra.
If in the following I try to describe things which I believe to have learned concern-
ing the interrelation between observed phenomena, concepts and mathematical struc-
tures I must precede this with some apologies. The inadequate handling of references
is due to the state of disorder in my notes and lack of time. The abstractions used
in describing the procedures of acquiring knowledge may be too schematic. There is
a painful gap between their qualitative character and the very precise mathematical
structures into which they are mapped.
2 Concepts and Mathematics in Quantum Theory
A paper describing some fascinating recent experiments was entitled ‘Reality or Il-
lusion? ’ These experiments (see e.g. refs. [1, 2, 3]) have lent impetus to the long
standing discussion about the meaning of reality in quantum theory. Do the dis-
coveries force us to abandon the naive idea of an outside world called nature whose
laws we try to find? What is the role of the observer? Do the puzzles relate to the
mind-body problem?
Many different views concerning such questions have been voiced throughout the
past seventy years. So if I try to express mine it may be pardonable to proceed in an
extremely pedantic fashion.
A single experiment of the type alluded to above combines many individual clicks
of some detectors. Though each click is unique and neither repeatable nor predictable
even under optimally controlled circumstances, we may regard it as a ‘real fact’
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in the sense in which these words are used in any other context. Let us call it
an ‘event’. Its existence is not dependent on the state of consciousness of human
individuals. In modern times it is usually registered automatically, stored in computer
memories and there is no dispute between the members of a group of experimenters
about its ‘reality’. The outcome of the experiment refers to the frequency with
which a particular configuration of events occurs in many runs and this is reported
as a probability of the phenomenon under precisely described circumstances. To
be accepted, this result must be reproducible by any other group of scientists who
is willing to invest time and resources in repeating the experiment. The events
mentioned are coarse. A detector is macroscopic. We regard macroscopic bodies
as ‘real objects’ and statements about their placement in space and time as ‘real
attributes’. The word ‘real’ just means here that such objects, events and their
space-time attributes belong to common experience shared by many persons and do
not depend on the state of consciousness of an individual. The observed relations
between them constitute the only empirical basis from which the ‘free invention’ of a
theory can proceed. With regard to this mental task there is a piece of wisdom which
I learned from F. Hund. It might be called Hund’s zeroth rule. He pointed out that
the progress of physical theory depended on the lucky circumstance that always some
effects were small enough to remain unnoticed or could be disregarded as insignificant
at the time a particular piece of the theory was proposed. We cannot take many steps
at the same time. We should regard a theory always as preliminary; it will disregard
some fine features of which we are luckily ignorant or which we neglect in order to
obtain a tractable idealization.
The purpose of these lengthy elaborations is twofold. First, I do not think that
physics can make any contribution to the mind-body problem. The attempt to explain
some puzzling aspects of quantum physics by invoking subjective impressions and the
role of the consciousness of individual human beings is not an appropriate answer.
Secondly, the concept of event is necessary in quantum physics. It is an independent
concept. The mental picture that it corresponds to an interaction process between an
atomic object and a macroscopic one is misleading because experiments tell us that
there are no atomic objects in an ontological sense (see below). Of course, from this
we may conclude that there are no macroscopic objects either and that their apparent
reality results from an asymptotic idealization. This is true (see e.g. the discussion in
ref. [4] of the emergence of classical concepts due to large size and decoherence). But
the idealization is covered by Hund’s zeroth rule and is essential for the form of the
present theory. If we want to avoid it we must take the next step in the development
of the theory. Let us address now some specific aspects.
1. In experiments we usually (necessarily?) distinguish two parts: a source which
determines the probability assignments (subsumed under the notion of ‘state’), and a
set of detectors to whose responses the probabilities apply. Though in the description
of the source a variety of considerations enter which will have to be looked at more
closely, we shall, for simplicity of language, just idealize it as characterized by some
pattern of ‘source events’. The total setting, consisting of source events and target
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events, where the former determine a conspicuous probability assignment for the
occurrence of the latter, may be called a ‘quantum process’. Bohr emphasized the
indivisibility of the process as one of the key lessons of quantum theory. This poses
the question of how we can isolate such a process from the rest of the world. In
technical terms, what do we have to take into account in ‘preparing a state’ in order
to get a reproducible probability assignment for a pattern of target events (defined by
some arrangement of detectors). Here we are helped by lucky circumstances. We live
in a reasonably steady environment; its influence does not change rapidly in space
and time. So, if we are stupid in the state preparation we just get an uninteresting
probability assignment, a ‘very impure state’. The art of the experimenter is needed
to improve state preparation and render the probability assignment as conspicuous
as possible. It appears, however, that there is a limit to such improvements, idealized
by the notion of a ‘pure state’.
2. Given some definite process one would like to assign to it a ‘physical system’
as the agent producing the target events or, more carefully, as the messenger between
source and target events. This is clearly a mental construct. Can we attach any
element of reality to it? If we focus on a single event involving one detector far
removed from the source we may think of a single particle as this messenger. But
we may also consider patterns of several events, seen in coincidence arrangements of
detectors far removed from the source and from each other. Then we sometimes find
correlations in their joint probabilities which are of a very peculiar type. If we believe
that there is a specific messenger from the source to each target event (for instance a
particle) then, whatever notion of state we try to assign to those, we cannot represent
the joint probability for the pattern of events as arising from joint probabilities for
a corresponding set of individual states of the messengers. This is the conclusion to
be drawn from the violation of Bell’s inequality. It is not so easily seen in the first
discussions which focused on hidden variables but emerges clearly in ref. [5]. Another
equally surprising effect has been demonstrated by Hanbury-Brown and Twiss. They
start from two entirely independent source events (for instance photons emitted from
two far distant surface regions of a star which happen to arrive almost simultaneously
in the observatory). So they can cause a coincidence in two detectors. Each detector
responds to one photon but can, of course, not distinguish from which source event
it comes. By varying the difference of the optical paths from the telescope exit to
the two detectors one finds varying intensity correlations in the coincidence signals.
This means that the cause for the response of one detector cannot be attributed to
the arrival of either a messenger from the left edge or from the right edge of the star.
Both photons work together though there is no phase relationship between the two
emission acts. There is a causal relation between the pattern of two source events
and the pattern of two target events but it cannot be split into causal ties between
single events.
Taken together these experiences imply that the notion of a ‘physical system’ does
not have independent reality. What is relevant for the click of a single detector is
some notion of ‘partial state’ prevailing in its neighborhood. In both of the above
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examples this is described as an impure state of a single particle. In the EPR-example
as discussed by Bell it is determined by one source event, the decay of an unstable
particle. In the second example it is caused by two source events. The probability
for the response of both detectors in coincidence depends on the partial state in the
union of the two neighborhoods and this is apparently not determined by the pair
of partial states around the individual detectors. Thus quantum physics exemplifies
the saying: ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’ and it does so in extreme
fashion. The Pauli principle claims that all electrons in the universe are correlated.
The reality behind the mental picture of a physical system consisting of a certain
number of particles refers to a certain set of events with causal connections between
them, manifested by the existence of a probability for the total process. In an ideal
experiment this is obtained by counting the number of times the pattern of target
events is realized, dividing it by the number of times the source events occured. In
the usually prevailing cases where the source is not adequately known we can still
determine relative probabilities of different patterns of target events assuming that
the source remains constant.
The holistic aspect mentioned above is often called the ‘essential non-locality’ of
quantum theory. But this is an unfortunate terminology because the only reason why
we can talk about specific processes at all resides in the locality of individual events
and the causal structure of space-time.
3. The reader may have wondered why I specialized the usual notion of ‘ob-
servable’ to that of a detector and talked about events instead of measuring results
indicated by the position of a pointer of some instrument. The spectral resolution of
self-adjoint operators which played such an essential role in the development of early
quantum mechanics was not even mentioned so far. One reason for this is the prob-
lem of how to achieve the mapping from a particular arrangement of instruments to
its representative in the mathematical scheme. In early quantum mechanics the idea
that we consider a physical system consisting of a definite number of particles seemed
to pose no problem (a beautiful illustration of Hund’s zeroth rule). The degrees of
freedom were positions and momenta, appearing in the canonical formalism of classi-
cal mechanics on equal footing. Though it became clear that these degrees of freedom
could not be real attributes of the system one still talked about measuring one of them
(or simple functions of them like energy and angular momentum). Bohr emphasized
that the full description of the experimental arrangement is needed ‘to tell our friends
what we learned’ and that this could only be done in plain language. But, since the
classical degrees of freedom persisted, this description of the arrangement could ulti-
mately be summarized by one mathematical object which corresponded in a symbolic
way to a classical quantity. How can one proceed in this passage from the description
of an arrangement of hardware to a mathematical symbol relating to the system?
The primary piece of information is given by the placement of macroscopic bodies
in space-time. These bodies perform different functions. Some parts may be consid-
ered as ‘state preparation procedures’ representing the source events. Other parts
yield the measuring result which is an unresolvable phenomenon, an unpredictable
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decision in nature, a coarse event. Its primary attribute is an approximate position
in space-time. The representation of the whole arrangement (apart from the primary
source) by a self-adjoint operator, interpreted as describing the measurement of a
quantity related to some function of the classical degrees of freedom involves the
theory (Schro¨dinger equation) in conjunction with idealizations and approximations
which are transparent only in simple cases. The operators corresponding to momen-
tum and energy have clear significance as generators of translations in space and time
but are only indirectly related to observations, which in the last resort concern the
position of an event in space-time. The position operator of a particle at a prescribed
time yields spectral projectors which can approximately characterize an event. But
the assumed existence of a family of mutually exclusive events with certainty that
one of them must happen is an extrapolation which becomes highly unnatural in
relativistic situations. This is mildly indicated already by the ambiguities arising in
the attempt to define a position operator in Wigner’s analysis.
The fundamental discovery, that the ‘elementary particles’, formerly believed to
be the building stones of matter, are not eternal but can be created or destroyed in
processes, forces us to consider states whose particle content is not only varying but
undefined in some regions. While the concepts of ‘system’ or ‘particle’ suggest some
object existing in an ontological sense, the concept of ‘state’ belongs to the realm of
possibilities (potentialities, propensities) for the realization of something coming into
existence, an event. This would not be so in a deterministic theory but if we believe
that the indeterminacy in the prediction of phenomena, inherent in the formulation
of quantum physics, is a feature of the laws of nature and not just due to ignorance
which could be lifted by future studies then the distinction between the realm of
possibilities and the realm of facts becomes imperative. The ‘state’ belongs to the
former. Strictly speaking it provides a quantitative description of a contribution to
the probability for the occurrence of events. The other contribution is given by the
placement and type of detectors. Thus also the notions of ‘system’ and ‘particle’
belong to the realm of possibilities. But they retain their importance. They allow
us to classify (at least under favorable circumstances) the possible partial states in a
region by a denumerable set.
This procedure involves the center piece of the mathematics of quantum theory:
the superposition principle and eigenvalue problems; more generally, the determina-
tion of invariant subspaces in a complex linear space with respect to the action of the
symmetry group of the theory. The intuitive steps leading to the recognition that this
mathematical structure (Hilbert space, involutive algebras, representation theory of
groups) offers the key to quantum theory appear to me as a striking corroboration of
Einstein’s emphasis on free creations of the mind and Dirac’s conviction that beauty
and simplicity provide guidance.
Returning to our line of argument: the ordering of states in classes by the concept
of a ‘system’ corresponds to the selection of an invariant subspace, under the action
of the symmetry group. A minimal invariant subspace, an irreducible representa-
tion, may be called an elementary system. Its attributes are group characters. If we
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consider only the symmetry group of space-time, the Poincare´ group, the irreducible
representations give us states of a stable system, a system which could persist eter-
nally if it were alone in the world and no events could occur. This simple system is
a single particle. Its attributes are a value of the mass and the spin, which define a
group character. The reason why the simplest systems play such an important role
for observations is due to the circumstance that in many experiments the partial state
pertaining to a large but limited region of space-time can be very closely approxi-
mated by the restriction of a global single particle state to the region. This will, in fact
be the standard situation in the overwhelming part of space-time if the mean density
of matter is small. To obtain a basis in the space of single particle states we must
choose some maximal set of commuting generators. In this choice the generators of
space-time translations, whose spectral values are energy-momentum 4-vectors, play
a preferred role in the following respect. If we look in a region whose extension is
small compared to its mean distance from source events then the partial state there
is well approximated by a mixture of parts of plane waves, (improper) eigenstates of
the generators of translations, each belonging to a specific energy-momentum vector.
We confined attention so far to the Poincare´ group describing the space-time
symmetry. The full symmetry group includes ‘gauge symmetries’ whose characters
are charge quantum numbers. The first example was the electric charge with its
description as a character of U(1). The generalizations of this in high energy physics
led to flavor and color multiplets associated with the groups SU(2), SU(3). To avoid
misunderstandings it must be stressed that we talk here about a global gauge group.
The significance of local gauge invariance will be addressed later.
2.1 Conclusions
Position and momentum belong to different parts of the scheme. Position is an
(approximate) attribute of an event, not of a particle, and the event marks a position
in space-time not a position in space at an arbitrarily assumed time (as the picture
of a world line for a particle would suggest). In simple cases the event may be
regarded as the interaction process between a particle and a detector. But the notion
of ‘particle’ does not correspond to that of an object existing in any ontological sense.
It relates to the simplest type of global state and describes possibilities, not facts.
The notion of ‘partial state’ demands in addition that we ignore all possible events
outside some chosen region and thus ignore possible correlations with outside events.
The concepts of ‘particle’ and ‘physical system’ arise from the possibility of ordering
global states into distinct classes defined by the symmetry group of the theory. A
particle corresponds to an irreducible representation of this group. Its attributes
are group characters. A system corresponds to some subrepresentation of the tensor
product of irreducible representations. Experience tells us that only a countable set
of irreducible representations (particle types) appears in nature. The determination
of these (the masses, spins, charge quantum numbers of physical particles) is one of
the tasks of the theory.
In observations we are concerned with partial states which result by the restriction
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of global states to some regions in which we choose to place detectors. For a fixed
global state the partial state in a region can be approximately described by the
restriction of a global state which belongs to the class of some specific system. In
other words: if we focus attention on some particular region then the global state
may tell us for instance that in there the probability for events is almost the same as
that predicted from the restriction of some single particle state. Indeed, if we choose
the region sufficiently small then it will usually suffice to consider only mixtures of
single particle states with definite momenta. The existence of zero mass particles
complicates this picture somewhat, as evidenced by laser beams and by infrared
problems where the number of particles is no longer useful for the description of a
partial state.
The analysis of global states in terms of various systems approximating the partial
states in various regions of space and time is the other task of the theory (the theory
of collision processes).
In the whole scheme we still need an observer. No facts are created if no detectors
are around anywhere. Though the consciousness of an individual plays no role (it was
eliminated by the assumed ‘as if’ reality of macroscopic bodies and coarse events)
the scheme still appears somewhat artificial. It is a description of what we may learn
by experiments. But looking at the detailed mathematical structure, developed to
cope with the above mentioned tasks of the theory, it seems clear that the notions
of macroscopic bodies and coarse events are asymptotic concepts. If, on the other
hand, we wish to replace them by finer ones we encounter difficulties. They can,
I believe, not be overcome without a radical change of the formalism involving our
understanding of space and time. As long as there is an enormous disparity between
collision partners, one being a macroscopic body the other an atomic object, we
can talk about an approximate position of the event and give upper bounds for its
uncertainty, relating to the size and the time of sensitivity of the (effective part of the)
detector, and we can give lower bounds for the energy- momentum transfer needed
to overcome the barriers against the appearance of a significant change. This suffices
for practical purposes but does not seem to be the ultimate answer if we look at the
vertex of a high energy event in a storage ring.
3 The mathematical structure in relativistic quan-
tum physics and its interpretation
In quantum field theory the basic mathematical objects, the fields, are functions of
points in space-time. These are singular objects which have to be smeared out over
some finite regions to yield observables which can be represented by operators in a
Hilbert space. There are problems. Some serious ones are related to gauge invariance,
specifically to the local gauge principle first encountered in quantum electrodynamics
(QED). If one wants to avoid ‘unphysical states’ one has to restrict attention to gauge
invariant quantities. From these one may hope to construct algebras of observables.
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To be precise: we abstract from this heuristic consideration that we can obtain a
normed, involutive algebra (for short, a C∗-algebra) for each bounded, open region
O of space-time. The correspondence
O → A(O) (3.1)
between regions and algebras yields one essential piece of information for the analysis
of the consequences of the theory. We call A(O) the algebra of observables of the
region O. There are some natural relations between these local algebras. Obvious is
the inclusion relation:
(i) O1 ⊂ O2 implies A(O1) ⊂ A(O2).
This allows the definition of a global C∗-algebra A as the ‘inductive limit’, the com-
pletion of the union of all local algebras in the norm topology.
The second important relation reflects the causal structure of space-time:
(ii) If O1 is space-like to O2 then A(O1) and A(O2) commute.
The third basic ingredient is covariance with respect to the Poincare´ group P.
We need a realization of P by automorphisms of A; to each element g ∈ P there
is an automorphism of A denoted by αg which should have the obvious geometric
significance:
(iii) If A ∈ A(O), then αgA ∈ A(gO),
where gO denotes the region resulting from shifting O by g. It is convenient to
assume that these algebras have a common unit element.
We call the structure defined by the correspondence (3.1) with the properties
mentioned a (covariant) net of local algebras. A general state ω corresponds to a
normalized, positive linear form i.e. a linear function A → ω(A) from the algebra A
to the complex numbers which takes real, non-negative values on the positive elements
of the algebra:
ω(A∗A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ A; ω(1) = 1. (3.2)
A partial state in some region O is defined in the same way with A replaced by
A(O). It corresponds to the restriction of a class of global states to the subalgebra
considered.
From section 2 we see that the physical interpretation requires a characterization
of those elements of A which represent detectors for an event in a region O. The
first guess might be to identify the projectors in A(O) with such detectors. This is,
however, not sufficient. A detector, in contrast to a source, must be passive; it should
not click in the vacuum situation. We must control the energy- momentum transfer.
Starting from any elementA ∈ A we can construct elements
A(f) =
∫
(αxA)f(x) d
4x, (3.3)
where x refers to a translation in space-time. If the Fourier transform of the function
f has support in a region ∆ in p-space then the energy-momentum transfer of A(f)
is limited to ∆. Therefore we add to the structure described so far the (somewhat
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over-idealized) assumption that there exists a ground state ω0, the vacuum, which is
invariant with respect to the Poincare´ group and is annihilated by any L ∈ A which is
of the form (3.3) with support ∆ outside of the closed forward cone V + (positive time-
like vectors in p-space including 0). This assumption, called the spectrum condition,
allows us to define detectors which are approximately associated to a region O in
position space and to some window ∆ in p-space indicating the minimal energy-
momentum of the ‘atomic object’ needed for the response of the detector. Any
element
P = L∗L with ‖P‖ = 1, L = A(f) (3.4)
represents such a detector if we start with A ∈ A(O) and choose the function f so
that (apart from small negligible tails) the support in x-space is a small region around
the origin and its Fourier transform is practically zero outside of the region ∆. Of
course this does not yield a precise localization or momentum transfer but this is not
relevant if we think of a detector as a macroscopic body. Let us note that P will
in general not be a projector but this is not necessary either, because we need not
consider the negation, an instrument which indicates with certainty that no event
has happened.
The above characterization of a detector does not tell us what the detector detects.
But we discover that such additional information is not needed a priori. If the net
is given and a vacuum state exists (the spectral condition), then we have the tools
to analyze the physical content of the theory by studying the response of coincidence
arrangements, represented by products of Pk belonging to mutually space-like situated
localization regions, in any state. A single particle state, for instance, can be defined
as a state which is ‘simply localized at all times’, i.e. never capable of producing a
coincidence of two (space-like separated) detectors:
ω(P1P2) = 0 (3.5)
for any such choice of the Pk (k = 1, 2), but ω(P ) 6= 0 for some P . For further
elaborations see [6].
A net satisfying only the requirements mentioned so far need not yield a physi-
cally reasonable theory. It may, for instance, describe no particles at all or a non-
denumerable number of different types. Further properties are needed. Some nec-
essary conditions are known which concretize the structure considerably and relate
to various physical aspects ranging from the appearance of charge quantum numbers
in particle physics to properties of thermodynamic equilibrium states [6, 7]. But we
do not know yet how to formulate restrictive conditions powerful enough to define a
specific net, let alone the ambitious aim of constructing a net whose physical content
is corroborated by experiments.
It is my personal conviction that in this step the local gauge principle plays a
crucial role. This assessment stems partly from progress in theoretical high energy
physics in the past decades and partly from my belief in simplicity and naturalness
of fruitful basic concepts. The principle mentioned tells us that we should not try to
focus on global symmetries. In a local theory the symmetries should only govern the
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structure in the small and the comparison of their action in different regions needs
additional information which is called a ‘connection’ because the comparison depends
on the way we pass from one region to the other. In the two important classical field
theories which have proved their worth for physics, Maxwell’s electrodynamics and
Einstein’s general relativity, this principle is encoded. In the former it was recognized
rather late and refers to the gauge symmetry related to electric charge; in the latter it
was one of the guiding principles and refers to the Poincare´ symmetry of space-time.
The Lorentz part, which keeps one point in space-time fixed, is reduced to a local
symmetry for the tangent space at this point; the translations are replaced by the
connection. Quantum physics as we know and use it is anchored on the uncritical
acceptance of space-time as an arena in which we can place instruments, an arena
with known geometry including a causal structure. Some aspects of the theory depend
also on the existence of a global symmetry for this geometry.1 If we loose this anchor
completely we enter an area in which the conceptual structure and mathematical
formalism of quantum physics cannot persist. In this area the problem mentioned
at the end of section 2 and some of the questions addressed in the next section may
become imperative. So, to stay on the present level, we wish to keep global Poincare´
symmetry and only reduce the internal symmetries, relating to the charge structure,
to local significance needing the definition of a connection. In a classical field theory
the formalism of Yang-Mills theories, generalizing electrodynamics to non-Abelian
local internal symmetry groups, is well understood, using the notions of sections and
connections in a fiber bundle. The transfer of this formalism to quantum theory
is highly nontrivial and, in my opinion, not yet adequately understood. If we use
the approach via algebras of observables sketched above then the incorporation of
the additional structure due to (not directly observable) local internal symmetries
is obscured by the singular nature of points and lines used in the classical case.
To handle this we need knowledge about the short distance behavior (ultraviolet
limit) of the theory. A few tentative suggestions concerning the notion of a quantum
connection are given in ref. [7]. I consider the clear understanding of how local
internal symmetries can be incorporated in a well defined mathematical structure as
one of the most important immediate aims on which many subsequent developments
may hinge. It constitutes, of course, a hybrid theory since the global nature of the
geometric symmetries is kept. So it may not be of primary importance to clarify
whether the continuum limit really exists.
1Quantum physics in ‘curved space-time’ (representing a given, external gravitational field) re-
tains the first part of these requirements. This means that the net structure of local algebras with
the properties (i), (ii) persists. The loss of (iii) implies that the spectrum condition has to be
replaced. A considerable amount of work has been devoted to this problem but we shall not discuss
it here; it would be beyond the scope of this paper.
13
4 Retrospective and Perspectives
Comparing the picture sketched so far with the discussions on the interpretation of
quantum theory seventy years ago we may note:
1. The ‘language of classical physics’ stressed so much by Bohr as indispensable
for the observer (to enable him to tell what was done and learned) remains an es-
sential ingredient but, if we disregard questions of convenience, it may be reduced to
the description of geometric relations in the placement of various macroscopic bodies
and the coarse events observed in space and time. All further information is con-
tained in the mathematical structure. The correspondence principle needed to map
the description into the realm of mathematical symbols is provided by the reference
to classical space-time and its geometric symmetry on both sides. It is the correspon-
dence (3.1) together with the action of the translation group, needed to characterize
the passive nature of detectors by (3.4). Apart from this the global symmetry of
space-time is needed in two respects. In a single experiment because it studies the
statistical relations in an ensemble of many individual event patterns which occur at
different times and in the communication with other observers who would like to test
the results in a different region of space-time.
2. The indivisibility of a process emphasized by Bohr leads to the concept of
an event as an irreducible unit and it manifests itself also in the holistic aspect
of the causal relations between events. The isolation of an individual process as a
distinguishable, coherent part in the history of the universe, a pattern of events which
can be considered by itself without mentioning its ties with other parts, depends to
some extent on the choice of the observer of how much he wants to consider but this
choice is limited by the requirement that it must lead to a well defined conspicuous
probability assignment for the total process, a requirement which can be precisely
fulfilled only in a steady environment.
3. The distinction between possibilities and facts which appears to be unavoidable
in a formulation of indeterministic laws implies a distinction between future and
past. Bohr mentions the ‘essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of
observation’. If the term observation does not mean that the ultimate responsibility
for deciding what constitutes a fact is delegated to the consciousness of an individual
human being2 then we must accept the essential irreversibility inherent in the concept
of an event. This endows the ‘arrow of time’ with an intrinsic significance in the
physical theory and corresponds to a picture of reality as evolving in successive steps
of a process with a moving boundary, separating past facts from future possibilities.
It corresponds to the picture drawn by the philosopher A.N. Whitehead [8]. This
does not conflict with the existence of a time reversal symmetry of the theory which
describes a symmetry in the probability assignments for processes. The significance
of the arrow of time is encoded in the existing theory by the spectrum condition for
the energy-momentum of states entering in the characterization of detectors (which
provide one contribution for the probability of an event). The time reversal operator,
2I think this would be too unreliable to be useful for the purposes of physics.
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being anti-unitary, does not change the sign of the energy.
Turning now to perspectives for future development of the theory, we might take
a few hints from the preceding discussion. First, that all symmetries should be
considered as local but that we should not associate the meaning of local with a
point in a space–time continuum but with a possible event. A pattern of events
with a web of causal ties between them bears some analogy to a section in a fiber
bundle whose base space is the set of events and the typical fiber is a direct sum of
representations of the symmetry group. The causal ties provide the connection. The
dynamical law must then describe the probability assignment for different possibilities
of growth of such a pattern in the evolution process in which possibilities turn into
facts and the boundary between past and future changes. Included in this task is the
determination of the subset of representations in the fiber of an event, the generalized
eigenvalue problem yielding the relation between masses, spins and charge quantum
numbers. I shall not try to elaborate on the many questions connected with such a
picture and its relation to existing formalism. This is beyond the scope of this paper
and the capabilities of its author.
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